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NOTES
executive compliance according to the legislative mandate. Soft-
ening that mandate by construction serves to provide a gloss
that the agency is properly performing the duties assigned by the
statute, and operates, in effect, to gloss over and screen out any
shortfalls in agency performance from the committees and bodies
of the legislature. They might otherwise be compelled-by ex-
plicit judicial avowal that its decree enforcing the legislative will
cannot be enforced by sanctions-to confront the gulf between
their expressed will and the practical realities of agency compli-
ance."
In contrast, the author offers the observation that the relief afforded
by the exceptional circumstances clause may so dilute the disclo-
sure amendments that Congress, if still in favor of expedition, will
be compelled to enunciate its ultimate policies regarding resource
allocations and/or increase the funding of the agencies for request
screening. For proponents of disclosure, such a result would best
serve the public interest.
LOUISE H. MCMURRAY
The State College Press and the Public Forum
Doctrine
In a recent case the Fifth Circuit decided that a student
editor of a state university campus newspaper could not be com-
pelled to print paid advertisements submitted for publication.
The author of this note disputes the court's analysis in determin-
ing that the campus newspaper was not a public forum. Upon
concluding that a public forum was involved, the author argues
that the plaintiffs had a constitutionally protected right of access
arising from the first and fourteenth amendments.
The Mississippi Gay Alliance submitted a paid advertisement
and an announcement' to The Reflector, a Mississippi State Univer-
sity campus newspaper.' The advertisement informed the public of
61. Id. at 618 (Leventhal, J., concurring).
1. The Reflector regularly ran a "Briefs" section in which announcements of campus and
local organizations were printed gratuitously. Mississippi Gay Alliance v. Goudelock, 536
F.2d 1073, 1076 (5th Cir. 1976).
2. There was a dispute as to whether or not The Reflector was the "official" newspaper
of Mississippi State University. Plaintiffs claimed that it was (Complaint for Plaintiff at
paragraph 9), and that the paper itself bore the designation "Official Newspaper of Missis-
sippi State University" on the front page. The answer of the University stated that there was
no "official" university newspaper. Answer for Defendant at paragraph 9. The answer of
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the Alliance's meetings and of the counseling and legal services
offered. The student editor, Bill Goudelock, refused to print either
the advertisement or the announcement. Alleging infringement of
its first and fourteenth amendment rights, the Alliance and its
chairperson, Anne DeBary, filed suit in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Mississippi against Goudelock
and three University officials.' Plaintiffs' prayer for relief included
one hundred dollars actual damages,5 one hundred dollars punitive
damages, and an order commanding publication of the advertise-
ment and announcement in question as well as any future advertise-
ment or announcement submitted. Upon motion of the University
officials, the district court dismissed the complaint against them,
and the court, "of its own motion,"' dismissed the complaint
against defendant Goudelock. On appeal, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held, affirmed: Where the state
exercises no editorial control over a college newspaper, the first and
fourteenth amendments do not proscribe refusal of a student editor
to accept a paid advertisement for publication. Mississippi Gay
Alliance v. Goudelock, 536 F.2d 1073 (5th Cir. 1976).
The constitutional issues arising from this case involve the Alli-
ance's alleged right of access to express its views through the media
and the bounds of the campus newspaper editor's right to edit. This
direct clash between two protected first amendment rights-
freedom of speech and freedom of the press-presented the Fifth
Circuit with a dilemma.
Freedom of the press is guaranteed against infringement by the
first amendment.' It is made applicable to the states by the four-
teenth amendment.' Seemingly then, neither Congress nor a state
legislature may exercise any editorial control over a private pub-
lisher. Thus, in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,' the Su-
defendant Goudelock also denied the allegations in paragraph 9 of the complaint; and further
stated the truth to be that The Reflector was the "official" newspaper of the Mississippi State
Student Association and the student body of Mississippi State University. Answer for Defen-
dant at paragraph 9.
3. The content of the announcement does not appear in the record. 536 F.2d at 1074.
4. The University officials joined as defendants were: William L. Giles, President of
M.S.U.; Henry F. Myers, faculty advisor to The Reflector; and Sam Dudley, Chairman of
the Communications Department.
5. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), any person who is deprived of his constitutional rights
by one acting under color of state law has an action at law for damages and may maintain a
suit in equity to enjoin the illegal acts.
6. Mississippi Gay Alliance v. Goudelock, No. EC-74-28-K, slip op. at 12 (N.D. Miss.
Oct. 25, 1974).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
8. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
9. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
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preme Court invalidated a Florida "right of reply" statute' which
required a newspaper to print the reply of any candidate for nomina-
tion or election who is criticized by that paper. The Court said:
The choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions
made as to limitations on the size and content of the paper, and
treatment of public issues and public officials-whether fair or
unfair-constitute the exercise of editorial control and judgment.
It has yet to be demonstrated how governmental regulation of this
crucial process can be exercised consistent with First Amend-
ment guarantees of a free press as they have evolved to this
time."
Similarly, in Associates & Aldrich Co. v. Times Mirror Co.,'" the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of an action
seeking to enjoin an editor from censoring advertising copy proffered
by the plaintiff. 3
Despite judicial reluctance to interpret the first amendment to
protect the public against discriminatory editing practices of pri-
vate publishers, several commentators 4 have advocated the so-
called "access theory." The theory and its underlying policy are best
set forth by its originator and chief proponent Professor Jerome A.
Barron:
There is an anomaly in our constitutional law. While we
protect expression once it has come to the fore, our law is indiffer-
ent to creating opportunities for expression. Our constitutional
theory is in the grip of a romantic conception of free expression,
a belief that the "marketplace of ideas" is freely accessible. But
if ever there were a self-operating marketplace of ideas, it has
long ceased to exist ...
The conventional constitutional issue is whether expression
already uttered should be given first amendment shelter or
whether it may be subjected to sanction as speech beyond the
constitutionally protected pale. To those who can obtain access
10. FLA. STAT. § 104.38 (1973) (repealed 1975).
11. 418 U.S. at 258.
12. 440 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1971).
13. The advertisement was for a movie which, although not legally obscene, was deemed
offensive by the defendant newspaper. Id. at 134.
14. See generally Barron, An Emerging First Amendment Right of Access to the Media?,
37 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 487 (1969); Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment
Right, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1641 (1967); Note, The Duty of Newspapers to Accept Political
Advertising-An Attack on Tradition, 44 IND. L. J. 222 (1969); Comment, Constitutional
Law: The Right of Access to the Press, 50 NEB. L. REv. 120 (1971); Note, Monopoly Newspa-
pers: Troubles in Paradise, 7 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 268 (1970); Note, Resolving the Free
Speech-Free Press Dichotomy: Access to the Press Through Advertising, 22 U. FLA. L. REV.
293 (1969); Note, Free Speech and the Mass Media, 57 VA. L. REv. 636 (1971).
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to the media of mass communications first amendment case law
furnishes considerable help. But what of those whose ideas are too
unacceptable to secure access to the media? To them the mass
communications industry replies: the first amendment guaran-
tees our freedom to do as we choose with our media. Thus the
constitutional imperative of free expression becomes a rationale
for repressing competing ideas.'5
Proponents of the access theory analogize the case of newspa-
pers to that of broadcasts. It has been held that broadcasters may
be compelled to provide access to those criticized by their broad-
casts.' 6 The argument is that since the broadcast rule is a by-
product of the limited number of air waves,'7 then the fact that there
are a limited number of newspapers" should, by analogy, require an
extension of the access rule to newspapers."
The counterargument to the access theory, espoused by advo-
cates of the "autonomy theory,"2 ° is that the first amendment
stands as a bar to any government-enforced access to privately
owned publications. That is, under our constitutional scheme, pri-
vate publishers enjoy an autonomous position free from governmen-
tal interference in editorial decisions. Supporters of the autonomy
theory argue against the broadcast analogy for three reasons. First,
the analogy fails because broadcasters must have a license from the
government while newspapers may be published by anyone, at any
time, without any governmental license or approval.2' Second, the
first amendment, as applied by the fourteenth, offers protection
only from acts of the state so that the acts of a private publisher
cannot be reached.2 Third, employment of an access-oriented policy
would entail the practical problem of deciding how far the govern-
ment could go to equalize methods of access to the media. 3
The arguments on both sides are formidable and the equities
are by no means clear-cut. Kenneth L. Karst points out: "The
15. Barron, supra note 14, at 1641-42.
16. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 381 F.2d 908 (D.C. Cir., 1967), aff'd, 395 U.S.
367 (1969).
17. Id. at 928.
18. At least one writer suggests attacking the problem through strict enforcement of
antitrust laws. Note, Reaffirming the Freedom of the Press: Another Look at Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 73 MICH. L. REV. 186, 199-200 (1974). This analysis is rejected by
another writer. Note, Monopoly Newspapers, supra note 14.
19. See Note, Resolving the Free Speech-Free Press Dichotomy, supra note 14, at 314-
15; Note, Monopoly Newspapers, supra, note 14.
20. Note, Reaffirming the Freedom of the Press, supra, note 18.
21. Id. at 198-99.
22. Loper, Book Review, 26 MAINE L. REV. 415, 422-23 (1974).




media-access cases are problematical not because they require a
choice between equality and freedom, but because both equality
and freedom are to be found on either side of the argument."24
The Supreme Court, however, has firmly decided the issue. In
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,25 the Court, after an ex-
tensive examination of the access theory, rejected any such right of
access to a privately published newspaper. Thus, the autonomy
theory is now the weight of authority and there is only a very limited
area in which government may exercise any censorship over a pri-
vate publisher.2" The situation is different, however, where the pub-
lication is an arm of the state; once state action is invoked, the
fourteenth amendment demands equality." It is this equality prin-
ciple which has led to the development of the "public forum doc-
trine.""
If any right of access to The Reflector were to have been af-
forded the Alliance, it would have had to stem from an application
of the public forum doctrine. Essentially, this doctrine holds that
once a state creates a forum for the expression of views, it cannot
discriminate on the basis of the content of any viewpoint sought to
be aired. Police Department v. Mosley"5 is the case usually cited on
this point:3"
Necessarily, then, under the Equal Protection Clause, not to
mention the First Amendment itself, government may not grant
the use of a forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but
deny use to those wishing to express less favored or more contro-
versial views. And it may not select which issues are worth dis-
cussing or debating in public facilities. There is an "equality of
status in the field of ideas," and government must afford all
points of view an equal opportunity to be heard. Once a forum is
opened up to assembly or speaking by some groups, government
24. Id. at 43.
25. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
26. Even a private publisher has no first amendment protection when it comes to
"unprotected speech." Unprotected speech has been held to include libelous remarks. Beau-
harnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 254 (1952). But see New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 255
(1964) (newspaper held not liable for libel). Also unprotected are obscenity, Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), and "fighting words," Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568 (1942).
27. "No state shall ... deny to any person ... the equal protection of the laws." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
28. The term "public forum" was first used by Harry Kalven, Jr. Karst supra note 23,
at 35-36.
29. 408 U.S. 92 (1972). In Mosley, a citizen who had frequently picketed a local school
to protest racial discrimination challenged a local ordinance which prohibited all picketing
at schools except that which related to a labor dispute involving the school. The Court
invalidated the ordinance on first amendment grounds.
30. "The citation and quotation of Mosley is becoming commonplace as a shorthand for
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may not prohibit others from assembling or speaking on the basis
of what they intend to say. Selective exclusions from a public
forum may not be based on content alone, and may not be justi-
fied by reference to content alone."'
The concept of the public forum has been repeatedly acknowl-
edged and affirmed.32 Thus, the issue in the noted case becomes:
does The Reflector qualify as a public forum so that the Alliance
may claim a constitutionally protected right of access to its
columns? The answer is to be found in the public forum cases and
in the contours of the state action doctrine.
There is little doubt that The Reflector, a Mississippi State
University campus newspaper,33 may fall within the public forum
doctrine. The doctrine has been applied to state school newspapers
in both Lee v. Board of Regents of State College34 and Zucker v.
Panitz.35 The fact that access was sought to advertising columns
rather than to news or editorial columns of the newspaper does not
detract from the public forum argument of the Alliance. In both Lee
and Zucker as well as in Radical Lawyers Caucus v. Pool" and
Kissinger v. New York City Transit Authority, 37 courts commanded
the first amendment's principle of equal liberty of expression." Karst, supra note 23, at 66.
31. 408 U.S. at 96 (footnote omitted).
32. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (public theatre); Gay
Students Org. v. Bonner, 509 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1974) (campus meetings); Southeastern
Promotions, Ltd. v. City of W. Palm Beach, 457 F.2d 1016 (5th Cir. 1972) (public theatre);
Lee v. Board of Regents of State Colleges, 441 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1971) (campus newspaper);
Toward a Gayer Bicentennial Comm. v. Rhode Island Bicentennial Found., 417 F. Supp. 632
(D.R.I. 1976) (bicentennial ceremonies); Radical Lawyers Caucus v. Pool, 324 F. Supp. 268
(W.D. Tex. 1970) (state bar association journal); Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102 (S.D.
N.Y. 1969) (high school newspaper); Kissinger v. New York City Transit Auth., 274 F. Supp.
438 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (subway trains). But see Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S.
298 (1974), where plaintiff was denied access to advertising space in buses on the ground that
only commercial, and not political, advertising was accepted. The Court distinguished this
case from other public forum cases on the ground that there is no right to subject people to
advertising, and people on buses comprise a "captive" audience who cannot avoid the mes-
sage of the advertiser. Id. at 302. This decision has been criticized on the ground that the
audience is "captive" whether the advertisements are political or commercial and there is
no sound reason for distinguishing the two. Karst, supra note 23, at 35.
33. See note 2, supra.
34. 441 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1971) (campus newspaper).
35. 299 F. Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (high school newspaper).
36. 324 F. Supp. 268 (W.D. Tex. 1970) (state bar association journal).
37. 274 F. Supp. 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (New York subway advertising). In this case, a
private advertising company was joined as a defendant. One writer suggests that this fact
may be significant in that the first amendment is being applied to a private party in contrad-
istinction to Miami Herald. Barron, supra note 14, at 489. It is suggested that this analysis
is a misreading of the Kissinger case. The New York City Transit Authority had a contract
with the advertising company which allowed the company to place advertisements in the
subway cars and on subway walls. This contractual relationship constituted state action;
[Vol. 32:173
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publication of advertisements under the public forum doctrine.
Since the doctrine is typically invoked upon a finding of state ac-
tion, an analysis of the Fifth Circuit's finding that no state action
existed38 is crucial to an examination of the noted case.
Neither the district court39 nor the Fifth Circuit4" cited any state
action cases. None of the student newspaper cases cited found any
real difficulty with the state action question. From the context of
their opinions, however, both the trial" and appellate courts4" found
state action wanting because the University officials exercised no
direct control over the newspaper or the editor's decision not to print
the advertisement.
An absence of direct control need not be determinitive of the
state action issue, however. In Coke v. City of Atlanta,4" where a
private airport restaurant refused to serve a black except in separate
dining facilities,44 the court found state action to exist notwithstand-
ing the fact that the city, which leased the restaurant, exercised no
control over the decision of the restaurant to discriminate.45 Other
courts have found state action in the absence of direct control by
the state." These courts have analyzed the state action problem by
several alternative methods which include: 1) a "significant involve-
ment" test;47 2) a "public function" test;8 3) a "but for" test;49 and
consequently, the court was not applying the first amendment to a private party. 274 F. Supp.
at 641.
38. 536 F.2d at 1074-75.
39. Mississippi Gay Alliance v. Goudelock, No. EC-74-28-K (N.D. Miss. Oct. 25, 1974).
40. 536 F.2d 1073 (5th Cir. 1976).
41. Mississippi Gay Alliance v. Goudelock, No. EC-74-28-K, slip op. at 6-7 (N.D. Miss.
Oct. 25, 1974).
42. 536 F.2d at 1074-75.
43. 184 F. Supp. 579 (N.D. Ga. 1960).
44. Although Coke involved racial discrimination and Mississippi Gay Alliance does not,
the difference is not necessarily significant. In Golden v. Biscayne Bay Yacht Club, 530 F.2d
16, 19 (5th Cir. 1976), Judge Coleman, who also wrote the opinion in Mississippi Gay Alliance,
clearly stated that the same standard is to be applied in determining state action in racial
discrimination cases as in all other cases. See 31 U. MiAMi L. REV. 198, 202-03 (1976).
45. Not only was there no actual control exercised by the state in the discriminatory acts,
but it appeared that there was little that the city could have done to prevent the restaurant
from discriminating. Perhaps the city could have made the lease conditional on an agreement
by the lessee not to discriminate or it could have passed legislation prohibiting any private
concern operating on publicly owned property from depriving any citizen of constitutional
rights. Having failed to do either, the city was left with no means by which it could have
reached the discriminatory policy of the restaurant.
46. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961); City of Greensboro v.
Simkins, 246 F.2d 425 (4th Cir. 1957); Derrington v. Plummer, 240 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1956),
cert denied, 353 U.S. 924 (1957); Department of Conservation & Dev. v. Tate, 231 F.2d 615
(4th Cir. 1956).
47. The significant involvement test looks to the nature and extent of the involvement
of the state in the challenged action. If such involvement is found to be "significant," then a
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4) a lease-license analysis."
An examination of the facts of the noted case reveals that a
finding of state action would not have been unwarranted under
these alternative state action theories. The facts show that the
paper was funded by a non-waivable tuition fee collected by the
University,5' that the editor was paid out of the funds so collected,12
that the paper used facilities of the University rent-free,": and that
the paper was a campus newspaper at Mississippi State Univer-
sity. 4
In the case of Bazaar v. Fortune, the mere fact that the newspa-
per was funded by a non-waivable fee assessed to all the students
was held sufficient to clothe the actions of the paper as state ac-
tion.55 Nor did it matter that the paper in question was not the
official newspaper of the university as long as it was funded by the
non-waivable fee.56
finding of state action is made. Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 173 (1972); Reitman v.
Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 386 (1967); cf. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715
(1961).
48. Whenever the challenged action occurs in the sphere of what is traditionally thought
of as a "public function," state action exists. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (action
of company-owned town is state action since governing a town is traditionally a public
function); Buckton v. NCAA, 366 F. Supp. 1152 (D. Mass. 1973) (action of a college is state
action as providing an education is traditionally a public function).
49. State action exists wherever the discrimination could not have occurred "but for"
the involvement of the state. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19 (1948); Ingram v. Dunn, 383
F. Supp. 1043, 1046-47 (N.D. Ga. 1974). This analogy to tort law, though not widely accepted,
is interesting. It is contended that if the analogy were more fully developed, its usefulness
would be more widely accepted. The Ingram court, for example, analyzes the problem in
terms of the "but for" test, but procedes no further with the analogy. This ignores the
proximate cause issue which usually follows the cause-in-fact ("but for") issue in a negligence
case. Thus, the "but for" test does not fully solve the problem. Many times a negligent act
will be the cause-in-fact but not the proximate cause of an injury. Proximate cause, which is
essentially a policy.issue, can be used to limit the set of cases reachable through state action
in much the same manner it has been used to limit the number of cases in which liability is
imposed despite the fact that cause-in-fact has been determined.
50. The general rule which seems to have evolved is that where the alleged violation is
made by a lessee of the state, state action is found; but where the alleged violation is made
by a licensee of the state, no state action is held to exist. See Columbia Broadcasting Sys.,
Inc. v. National Democratic Comm. 412 -U.S. 94 (1973) (broadcast license); Moose Lodge v.
Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (liquor license); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715
(1961) (lease); Hammond v. University of Tampa, 344 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1965) (gratuitous
lease); Derrington v. Plummer, 240 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1957) (lease); Ingram v. Dunn, 383 F.
Supp. 1043 (N.D. Ga. 1974) (business license); Coke v. City of Atlanta, 184 F. Supp. 579
(N.D. Ga. 1960) (lease). But see Golden v. Biscayne Bay Yacht Club, 530 F.2d 16 (5th Cir.
1976) (gratuitous lease).
51. 536 F.2d at 1074.
52. Complaint contained in Joint Appendix at 3, Mississippi Gay Alliance v. Goudelock,
No. EC-74-28-K (N.D. Miss. Oct.. 25, 1974).
53. 536 F.2d at 1085 (dissenting opinion).
54. See note 2 supra.




The mere fact that The Reflector used office space in the
state-owned university could have been sufficient to rest a finding
of state action. In Hammond v. University of Tampa,"7 the Fifth
Circuit decided that actionable racial discrimination" existed in a
private university solely on the grounds that the university's
" tablighment was largely made possible by the use of a surplus
city building and the use of other city land leased for the university
purposes." 59
In other school newspaper-public forum cases, there seemed to
be no real doubt about state action. In Lee v. Board of Regents of
State College"0 state action was conceded; in Zucker v. Panitz and
Joyner v. Whiting," it must have been assumed, for it was not
discussed.
Even assuming that the facts in the noted case, taken individu-
ally, do not require a finding of state action, it is difficult to argue
that, taken together, they do not show the significant involvement
requisite to such a finding. The Fifth.Circuit held no state action
to exist due to the fact that there was no direct action by a state
official. Yet no case is cited which would indicate that direct in-
volvement is a prerequisite of such a finding.63 Even Golden v. Bis-
cayne Bay Yacht Club, 4 an opinion of the Fifth Circuit written by
the author of the Mississippi Gay Alliance opinion, does not support
this proposition. In Golden the court had a perfect opportunity to
rest its refusal to find state action on the direct action theory, but
chose instead to rely on the significant involvement test. Thus,
Golden can be interpreted as an implicit rejection of the direct
action theory by the Fifth Circuit.
Two significant problems remain with the court's opinion.
First, the court failed to note the duality of the role of the newspaper
and its editor. Not only do they have rights and obligations in rela-
tion to the university, but they also have rights and obligations
versus the public. Second, the court misread Bazaar v. Fortune,65
an earlier Fifth Circuit case.
The court's approach as to the first problem seems to take
57. 344 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1965).
58. The fact that Hammond involves racial discrimination does not necessarily impair
the analogy. See note 44 supra.
59. 344 F.2d at 951.
60. 441 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1971).
61. 299 F. Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
62. 477 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1973).
63. 536 F.2d at 1084 (dissenting opinion).
64. 530 F.2d 16 (5th Cir. 1976).
65. 476 F.2d 570 (5th Cir. 1973).
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cognizance only of the rights of the editor and not of the rights of
the Alliance. The court reasoned that since the university officials
could not, under Bazaar, censor the paper, it had the rights of a
private publisher and according to Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo,5 it could not be compelled to publish the advertisement.
While it is true that the university may not abridge the first amend-
ment rights of the newspaper, it does not follow that the newspaper
occupies the role of a private entity beyond the reach of the four-
teenth amendment. There are strong indications that "this court
would review a decigion by the gtudents to exelude blackg from
participation on the newspaper staff as a decision imbued with state
action." 7 It is this duality which the court ignored, thereby over-
looking a crucial point in the course of its analysis of the case. The
Bazaar case addressed the rights of the paper with respect to its
position with the university; but it did not address the rights of a
citizen with respect to the newspaper, which is the issue in
Mississippi Gay Alliance.8
As to the second problem, the Fifth Circuit stated in reference
to Bazaar: "As a matter of fact, in the context of the matter before
us, this Court has held that the University authorities could not
have ordered the newspaper not to publish the Gay Alliance adver-
tisement, had it chosen to do so . . " 00 Such a reading of Bazaar
is improper in at least two ways. First, the "context" of Bazaar was
quite different from that of Mississippi Gay Alliance. In Bazaar, the
court acted to prevent censorship by the university, while in
Mississippi Gay Alliance, the court was asked to prevent discrimi-
nation in advertising where the university chose to remain idle.
Second, despite the implication that the university is, according to
Bazaar, powerless to restrict the newspaper in any way, this is not
necessarily true. Undoubtedly, publication of obscene materials
could be proscribed by the university. 0 Similarly, discriminatory
policies of the newspaper are subject to university review. In Joyner
v. Whiting,7 the Fourth Circuit indicated its agreement with the
university president who defended his right to prohibit a discrimi-
66. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
67. 536 F.2d at 1085 (dissenting opinion). Cf. Joyner v. Whiting, 477 F.2d 456, 463-64
(4th Cir. 1973), in which the court addressed this issue and indicated its support of the view
that such action may be reached.
68. The Court consistently frames the issue from the position of the newspaper and its
right to refuse the advertisement; it is never viewed from the perspective of the Alliance and
its right to be heard.
69. 536 F.2d at 1075.
70. See note 26 supra.
71. 477 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1973).
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natory policy in accepting staff members and advertisements.72
Clearly, Joyner indicates that the university officials could have
commanded publication of the advertisement which was arbitrarily
rejected. In fact, it is at least arguable that they should have com-
manded publication due to their obligation as state officers to pro-
tect constitutional rights."
In concluding that a right of access to The Reflector exists,
there are two remaining issues which must be resolved to determine
whether or not the right of access extends to the advertisement in
question. First, does the editor have a right which countervails the
Alliance's right of access? Second, does the advertisement fall
within the category of "unprotected speech"?
Judge Goldberg, in his dissent, addresses the first question,74
and there seems to be little reason to dispute his analysis. He bal-
ances the competing interests involved in this manner:
I think that the two interests [freedom of speech and free-
dom of the press] can be accommodated through a doctrine
which permits student editors of state newspapers unfettered dis-
cretion over what might be termed the "editorial product" of the
newspaper, yet requires that when the newspaper devotes space
to unedited advertisements or announcements from individuals
outside the newspaper staff, access to such space must be made
available to other similarly situated individuals on a nondiscrimi-
natory basis."5
This right of access, which is akin to the "fairness doctrine,""
is not a novel idea. Writing for the majority in Joyner, Judge Butz-
ner indicated that:
A college newspaper's freedom from censorship does not nec-
essarily imply that its facilities are the editor's private domain.
When a college paper receives a subsidy from the state, there are
strong arguments for insisting that its columns be open to the
72. Id. at 462-63 (decided on other grounds); cf. United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205
(4th Cir. 1972) (provision of Civil Rights Act prohibiting a newspaper from printing discrimi-
natory housing advertisements held to be constitutional).
73. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961), in which the
Court stated that:
[Tihe Authority [an agency of the state] could have affirmatively required
Eagle [the discriminating party] to discharge the responsibilities under the
Fourteenth Amendment imposed upon the private enterprise as a consequence of
state participation. But no State may effectively abdicate its responsibilities by
either ignoring them or by merely failing to discharge them whatever the motive
may be.
74. 536 F.2d at 1087-89.
75. Id. at 1087.
76. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
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expression of contrary views and that its publication enhance, not
inhibit, free speech."
It does not appear that the editor's first amendment rights
outweigh the first and fourteenth amendment rights of the Alliance.
Nor does it appear-in response to the second remaining issue-that
there is any reason for the advertisement to be without protection.
The only arguments that can be made to deny first amendment
protection to the advertisement are that commercial speech is not
protected and that the advertisement is so closely related to illegal
acts7" that it is stripped of protection.7" It is quite clear, however,
that commercial speech is protected,80 and that a mere gathering of
a gay group is not so closely related to illegal activity that it is
without first amendment protection."'
Based on the foregoing analysis, it is submitted that the Fifth
Circuit incorrectly decided the noted case. Unfortunately, the Alli-
ance's petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court
was denied."2 The result is that the Supreme Court leaves intact two
significant changes which the Fifth Circuit has made in constitu-
tional doctrines. First, without expressly stating so, the Fifth Cir-
cuit has imposed a requirement of direct action by the state before
invoking the protections afforded by the fourteenth amendment
and, in so doing, has ignored the Supreme Court's previous decision
in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority."3 Second, in circum-
venting the public forum doctrine by finding an absence of state
action, the court has severely limited the utility of that doctrine in
an area in which it had previously been recognized." Thus, the
77. Joyner v. Whiting, 477 F.2d 456, 462 (4th Cir. 1973).
78. The argument is that as a result of printing the Alliance's advertisement, acts of
unnatural intercourse will occur and such acts are proscribed by state law. Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 97-29-59 (1972).
79. Where speech is closely related to illegal activity it is not within the scope of the first
amendment's protection. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations,
413 U.S. 376, 388-89 (1973) (sexually discriminatory employment advertisements); Gay Lib
v. University of Missouri, 416 F. Supp. 1350 (W.D. Mo. 1976) (unnatural intercourse).
80. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748 (1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
81. Gay Students Org. v. Bonner, 509 F.2d 652, 662 (1st Cir. 1974); Toward a Gayer
Bicentennial Comm. v. Rhode Island Bicentennial Found., 417 F. Supp. 632, 637 n.6 (D.R.I.
1976); cf. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972) (S.D.S.). Contra, Gay Lib v. University of
Missouri, 416 F. Supp. 1350 (W.D. Mo. 1976), where the court upheld the university's decision
to withhold official campus recognition of a gay group on the grounds that illegal activ-
ity-unnatural intercourse-would likely result from allowing campus meetings of the gay
group.
82. 45 U.S.L.W. 3704 (U.S. April 26, 1977) (No. 76-956).
83. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
84. Lee v. Board of Regents of State Colleges, 441 F.2d 1257 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Zucker v.
Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
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opinion of the Fifth Circuit has a limiting effect on the protections
afforded by the first and fourteenth amendments. Because of this
limiting effect, it is suggested that the Court should have granted
certiorari and reversed the case.
RONALD D. POLTORACK
Fisher v. First National Bank of Chicago: 12
U.S.C. Section 85 Is Granted Automatic
Extraterritorial Effect
This note discusses the operation of the Seventh Circuit's hold-
ing that pursuant to 12 U.S. C. section 85 a national bank located in
Illinois may apply that state's interest rates in any other state.
Through an economic analysis, the author argues that this operation
is essentially sound but should be modified to permit the considera-
tion of conflicts of law principles. The operation of the exception to
this general rule is also considered. Specific attention is given to the
application and effects of the words "located" and "existing" as used
in section 85.
Fisher, an Iowa resident,' brought an action against the First
National Bank of Chicago, chartered in Illinois, alleging that the
interest charged in connection with its bank credit cards was usu-
rious under Iowa law. In Fisher v. First National Bank of Chicago2
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois3 to dismiss the
1. In June, 1969, plaintiff Fred Fisher ("Fisher"), a resident of Iowa, received a
credit card from The First National Bank of Chicago ("Bank"), a national banking
association located in Chicago, Illinois. Fisher accepted the card and used it numerous
times to obtain credit from the Bank pursuant to the terms of the agreement that was
enclosed with the card when he received it.
Brief for appellee at 2. (References to appendix omitted.)
2. 538 F.2d 1284 (7th Cir. 1976), cert: denied, 97 S. Ct. 786 (1977).
3. This action . . . was originally filed in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Iowa on September 3, 1971 ...
On May 9, 1972, on the Bank's motion, the district court dismissed the complaint
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Fisher requested reconsideration of that ruling
and also sought leave to file an amended complaint. ...
On June 14, 1972, the district court denied Fisher's motion for reconsideration,
and, on July 5, 1972, denied his motion for leave to amend the complaint. On appeal,
the district court's jurisdictional ruling was reversed (6-2) by the Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit sitting en banc, and the case was remanded with instructions that
Fisher be allowed to file his amended complaint. 479 F.2d 26 (8th Cir. 1973).
On remand, the district court took up the Bank's motion for a change of venue
pursuant to Section 94 of the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 94, and on February 14,
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